四是防止排放權交易價格大起大落。在市場建立初期，特別是在不允許跨期儲存和預支情況下，設定排放權交易價格上下限，有利于市場的平穩(wěn)運行。保留部分排放權政府儲備，也有利于增加靈活性，在市場需求過高時平抑價格，防止企業(yè)在短期內減排成本急劇上升。但排放權儲備應控制在一定限度內，給市場以穩(wěn)定的預期。

　　在我國，發(fā)改委等部門鼓勵有條件的地區(qū)和行業(yè)開展碳排放權交易，但應有大體統(tǒng)一的規(guī)則，防止市場價格過大波動而影響市場運行。各地企業(yè)往往擔心減排成本高而要求更多排放權，地方政府若過于隨意、過多地動用排放權儲備，勢必導致排放權價格劇烈波動。如果過早地開發(fā)衍生產品，現貨價格波動導致衍生品價格更大波動，將嚴重影響市場運行和減排成效。因此，排放權儲備的規(guī)模設定應以較準確的統(tǒng)計和測算為基礎，其發(fā)放應遵循嚴格、透明的程序。

作者：（王信  袁方）

注：

[1]如英國自愿碳排放權交易機制始于2002年，但由于政府未設定最高排放目標，企業(yè)往往與管理部門博弈最高排放限額，該交易機制并不成功（唐莉 2010）。

[2] HHI等于一個行業(yè)中各企業(yè)占行業(yè)總收入或總資產百分比的平方和，反映市場中企業(yè)規(guī)模的離散度。某產業(yè)內企業(yè)數量越多，規(guī)模越接近，HHI就越接近0。

[3]截至2010年7月，北京、上海交易所CDM項目分別成交3個和26個，成交量分別為41萬和120萬噸；北京、上海、天津交易所自愿減排項目分別成交4個、35個和2個，交易量分別為34萬、27萬和7萬噸（蔣兆理 2010）。

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